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Income Tax Deductions For Estate Planning Fees
I. INTRODUCTION
The need to engage the services of a lawyer may arise in a variety
of situations, and the possibility of deducting the fees for a lawyer's
services from the client's personal taxable income will ultimately
depend on which one of several competing policies of the tax law is
properly applicable under the particular circumstances. Taxpayers and
their attorneys should be aware of the deductibility of expenses incurred
for legal services rendered in connection with the planning of the
taxpayer's estate. Such estate planning services include the drafting of
a will, the arrangement of inter vivos and testamentary gifts, the
creation of inter vivos and testamentary trusts, and tax advice in
connection with estate planning. This paper will examine the extent of
permissible deductions from personal income tax liability for these
estate planning fees.
Since there is no explicit provision for attorneys' fees in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,1 the deductibility of such expenses
depends upon the context in which they are incurred. Legal expenses
incurred by an individual taxpayer are deductible from gross income
only if he can show that they come within either section 162,2 which
authorizes the deduction of trade or business expenses, or section 212,1
which permits the deduction of non-trade or non-business expenses.
Any individual expenses incurred for estate planning services would not
qualify as trade or business expenses, and, therefore, would be
deductible only under section 212 of the Code.
Section 212 authorizes the deduction of "ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(l) for the
production or collection of income; (2) for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income; or. (3) in connection with the determination, collection, or
refund of any tax."' The requirement that deductible expenses be
"ordinary and necessary" implies that they "must be reasonable in
amount and must bear a reasonable and proximate relation to the
1. The Code's closest approach to such expenses is a veiled reference in § 212(3), dealing
with expenses incurred in the determination of tax liability.
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 212.
4. Id.
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production or collection of taxable income or to the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income." 5
Because it cannot be reasonably argued that estate planning
services are for the production of income within the context of section
212(1), the deductibility of these expenses will be considered only under
sections 212(2) and 212(3).
II. DEDUCTIONS UNDER SECTION 212(2)
Prior to 1942 there was no statutory provision for the deduction
of nonbusiness expenses. If the expenditure in question was not incurred
in conducting a business activity it was not deductible. This rule was
strictly applied in the case of Higgins v. Commissioner in which the
Supreme Court held that expenses incurred by a taxpayer in managing
his income producing property were not deductible because the
taxpayer's investment activity did not constitute the carrying on of a
trade or business. Thus, while the income derived from investment and
other forms of nonbusiness activity would be taxable, the expenses
incurred in carrying on such activities were not deductible.
Congress acknowledged this inequity and responded by enacting
section 23(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the predecessor
of section 212(1) and (2) of the 1954 Code. The legislative purpose
underlying the enactment of section 23 (a)(2) was explained as follows:
The existing law allows taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in connection
with a trade or business. Due partly to the inadequacy of the statute and partly
to court decisions, non-trade or non-business expenses are not deductible, although
non-trade or non-business income is fully subject to tax. The bill corrects this
inequity by allowing all of the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
for the production or collection of income. Thus, whether or not the expense is in
connection with the taxpayer's trade or business, if it is expended in the pursuit
of income or in connection with property held for the production of income it is
allowable.
7
This legislative history demonstrates an intention on the part of
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(d) (1957). See Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365,
368, 370 (1945); Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251, 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
6. 312 U.S. 212 (1941). See also United States v. Pyne, 313 U.S. 127, 129, 132 (1941)
(attorneys' fees incurred by executors for advice in caring for investment not deductible as
business expense); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 313 U.S. 121, 124 (1941) (trustees'
commissions for management of trust investments not deductible because activity not "carrying
on business" within § 23(a) of Revenue Act of 1928, predecessor of § 162 of Internal Revenue
Code of 1954).
7. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-76 (1942). See also S. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1942).
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Congress to authorize, under either section 162 or section 212, a
deduction for all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in
connection with any activity carried on primarily for the production of
taxable income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance
of property held for the production of taxable income.
While section 262,8 which prohibits the deduction from gross
income of "personal, family or living expenses," continues to restrict
deductions under section 212, a great borderland of doubt still exists.
Courts have been unable to formulate consistent and unambiguous tests
for distinguishing nondeductible personal expenses from deductible
nonbusiness expenses falling within section 212. Consequently, there is
no single clear-cut standard that can be applied to determine the
deductibility of the expense of estate planning services under section
212(2).
A. The Gilmore "Origin Test"
In United States v. Gilmore and United States v. Patrick,'" the
Supreme Court established the principle that the deductibility of legal
fees under section 212(2) depends upon the "origin and character of
the claim" with respect to which the expense was incurred. Thus, if the
origin and character of the claim is a personal one, as for example, one
arising out of the marital relationship of the taxpayer, and not related
to a trade or business or other profit-seeking activity, the expense
would be characterized as personal and nondeductible."
In both Gilmore and Patrick the taxpayer-husband had attempted
to deduct that portion of the legal expenses incurred in a divorce
proceeding allocable to his attorney's efforts to preserve income-
producing property (taxpayer's controlling interest in several
corporations) demanded by the wife. The taxpayer argued, and the
lower courts agreed, that since the expense was incurred not to resist a
liability owing to the wife but to satisfy that liability without depriving
the taxpayer of income-producing property, it was for the conservation
of property held for the production of income. To this position the
Supreme Court in Gilmore replied "that the deductibility of these
expenses turns. . . not upon the consequences to respondent [taxpayer]
of a failure to defeat his wife's community property claims but upon
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262.
9. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). Both cases were decided under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(2),
53 Stat. 12 (now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 212(1), (2)).
10. 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262; Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1 (b)(7) (1957).
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the origin and nature of the claims themselves.' ' 2 Therefore, the
expense was not deductible as an expense incurred for the conservation
of property held for the production of income and was characterized
as a nondeductible personal expense.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Gilmore was intended to
resolve a conflict that had existed in lower court decisions as to the
deductibility of legal expenses incurred in the negotiations and property
settlements incident to divorce actions.13 The Court enunciated an
'apparently clear test for deductions under section 212(2):
[T]he origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was
incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer,
is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was "business" or "personal"
and hence whether it is deductible or not under . . . [section 212(2)];14 [therefore]
12. 372 U.S. 39, 43-44 (1963). See 15 ALA. L. REV. 624 (1963); 14 KANSAs L. REV. 85
(1965); 13 MERCER L. REV. 432 (1962).
13. The Tax Court and several circuit courts had held that such expenses were
nondeductible personal, living, or family expenses covered by the prohibition of § 262 and were
not expenses for the management, conservation, or maintenance of income-producing property.
Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958); Richardson v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 248
(4th Cir. 1956); Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953); Howard v.
Commissioner, 202 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1953); Dallman v. United'States, 191 F. Supp. 478 (N.D.
Cal. 1961); Charlotte M. Douglas, 33 T.C. 349 (1959); Estate of James E. Walsh, 28 T.C. 1274
(1957); accord, Shipp v. Commissioner, 217 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1954) (nondeductible expenses'in
defense of title to property).
To the contrary, other circuit courts and the Court, of- Claims had allowed the deduction of
legal expenses incurred in an uncontested divorce action not to resist the claims of the wife but
to arrange the satisfaction of the liability owing to the wife without depriving the taxpayer-
husband of income-producing property. These courts took the position that since the expense was
for arranging the manner and form of satisfying the wife's claim, rather than contesting it, they
were incurred for the purpose of conserving the husband's income-producing property and were
therefore deductible. In Baer v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952), the court held that
since the taxpayer was relatively unconcerned about the divorce itself "[tihe controversy did not
go to the question of . . . [his] liability [for alimony] but to the manner in which ... [that
liability] might be met . . . without greatly disturbing his financial structure;" therefore the legal
services were "for the purpose of conserving and maintaining" his income-producing property.
196 F.2d at 649-50, 651. Owens v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1959); Bowers v.
Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957), reversing, 25 T.C. 452 (1955); Allen v. Selig, 200
F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1952); Davis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961); McMurtry v.
United States, 132 F. Supp. 114 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Aller v. United States, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9867
(S.D. Cal. 1956); Patrick v. United States, 288 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 53
(1963); United States v. Gilmore, 290 F.2d 942 (Ct. Cl. 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
14. Compare present Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(m) (1957), which provides: "An expense (not
otherwise deductible) paid or incurred by an individual in determining or contesting a liability
asserted against him does not become deductible by reason of the fact that property held by him
for the production of income may be required to be used or sold for the purpose of satisfying
such liability." The legal fees in issue in Gilmore and Patrick were incurred before the adoption
of this regulation.
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. . . the only kind of expenses deductible under. . . [section 212(2)] are those that
relate to a "business," that is, profit-seeking purpose."
The rationale of the Gilnore decision and its origin test apparently
would bar the deduction of expenses incurred for estate planning
services. However, a close analysis of that decision suggests that the
origin test is not the exclusive test of deductibility under section 212(2).
Indeed, some lower courts have deemed the Gilmore origin test
inapplicable to deductions claimed under section 212(1)."6
As the Gilmore Court initially noted, the legislative history of
section 212 indicates that the section was enacted to provide a class of
deductions coextensive with those permitted by section 16217 and
subject to the same tests formulated for section 162, except that the
expense need not be incurred with respect to a business." Gilmore's
adoption of the origin test for section 212(2) was based primarily on
the notion that previous cases had indicated that an expense must have
a business origin to be deductible under section 162. However,
Kornhauser v. United States, a leading case interpreting section 162
and relied on by Gilnore, held that a legal expense was a deductible
business expense if the action against the taxpayer was "directly
connected with, or as otherwise stated . . . proximately resulted from,
his business .... ." The expense in question was deductible because
15. 372 U.S. 39, 46,49 (1963).
16. In Ruth K. wild, 42 T.C. 706 (1964), the Tax Court affirmed the continued validity,
even in light of Gilmore, of cases permitting a woman to deduct that portion of her legal expenses
in a divorce action allocable to her attorney's efforts to obtain taxable alimony as an expense
"for the production of income." The Tax Court did not accept the government's argument that
pursuant to the Gilmore decision these expenditures were nondeductible personal expenses since
they arose from the marital relationship and not from any profit-seeking activity. See also
Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964); Hazel Porter, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
448 (1966), affdon other grounds, 388 F.2d 670 (6th Cir. 1968).
17. "And committee reports make clear that deductions under the new section were subject
to the same limitations and restrictions that are applicable to those allowable under § 23(a)(1)
[now § 162]. Further, this Court has said that § 23(a)(2) 'is comparable and in pari inateria with
§ 23(a)(1),' providing for a class of deductions 'coextensive with the business deductions allowed
by § 23(a)(1), except for' the requirement that the income-producing activity qualify as a trade
or business. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365, 373, 374 (1945)." 372 U.S. at
45.
18. "A deduction under this section is subject, except for the requirement of being incurred
in connection with a trade or business, to all the restrictions and limitations that apply in the
case of the deduction under section 23(a)(1)(A) of an expense paid or incurred in carrying on any
trade or business." H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-76 (1942). See also S. REP.
No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1942).
19. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145, 153 (1928) (emphasis added) (legal expenses
incurred by taxpayer in successful defense of suit brought by former business partner for




it had a business origin, but there was no language in the Co.rt's test
or decision to compel the conclusion that the origin standard must be
exclusive.
The Court in Gilmore also found support for the origin test in
Lykes v. United States20 in which the Supreme Court denied a claim
for the deduction of legil expenses incurred contesting the assessment
of a gift tax liability. Rejecting the taxpayer's argument that his
expenses were incurred in the "conservation" of income-producing
property, and hence deductible, since payment of the tax deficiency
would have forced him to liquidate his stockholdings, the Court noted
that "deductibility [of expenses] turns wholly upon the nature of the
activities to which they relate. 21 The Court concluded that what is now
section 212(1) and (2), "has been applied to expenses on the basis of
their immediate purposes rather than upon the basis of the remote
contributions they might make to the conservation of a taxpayer's
income-producing assets by reducing his general liabilities.
2
Lykes might be used as the basis for denial of deductions claimed
under section 212(2) for certain estate planning fees because their origin
is the personal gift making or trust creation of the taxpayer. However,
the Lykes case involved tax advice, and the authority of the decision
has been greatly reduced, if not abrogated, by the subsequent
enactment in 1954 of section 212(3) which permits the deduction of
expenses incurred for the determination of any tax liability.2"
The refusal of many courts to be limited by the origin test
indicates that considerable judicial opinion favors a broader
interpretation of section 212.24 Indeed, most of the Supreme Court
decisions which articulated an origin test were dissented to on the
ground that the test unduly limits deductibility2s
20. 343 U.S. 118 (1952). See also Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940), in which
the Court held that "it is the kind of the transaction out of which the obligation arose. . . which
is crucial and controlling."
21. Id. at 123. Since gifts are the antithesis of the production or collection of income,
expenses incurred in connection with them are not deductible.
22. Id. at 125.
23. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 212(3). Seesection III infra.
24. Even under § 162, the source of the "origin" test, taxpayers have been allowed to
deduct legal expenses, although not arising from business origin, when the dominant purpose was
the protection of business. Paul Draper, 26 T.C. 201 (1956); accord, . Raymond Dyer, 36 T.C.
456 (1961). See also Lindsay C. Howard, 16 T.C. 157 (1951), affd on other grounds, 202 F.2d
28 (9th Cir. 1953).
25. United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53, 57 (1963); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S.
39, 52 (1963); Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 127 (1958); McDonald v. Commissioner,
323 U.S. 57, 65 (1944) (dissenting opinions). But see Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
1969]
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B. The Direct Connection Test
The language of section 212 implies a broader scope than the
origin test would permit. It is arguable that since section 212 was
enacted in response to the Higgins case, and since section 212(1)
completely covers the Higgins situation, the congressional enactment of
section 212(2) is indicative of a concern broader than the injustice of
the Higgins problem and the origin test.2 Even the current treasury
regulation uses language which is clearly broader than the origin test:
"[E]xpenditures directly connected with or pertaining to the taxpayer's
trade or business" are deductible.2 1 Moreover, the legislative history of
section 212 indicates that except for transactions carried on "primarily
as a sport, hobby, or recreation," Congress provided a deduction for
all ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the production of
income or in connection with the management, conservation, or
maintenance of income-producing property.
2 8
The legislative history and the judicial pronouncements other than
Gilmore strongly suggest that Congress did not intend section 212 to
be restricted by the origin test: if Congress intended section 212 to be
governed by the same standards as section 162, then it must not have
viewed either section as being subject exclusively to an origin test. A
House Report states: "[W]hether or not the expense is in connection
with the taxpayer's trade or business, if it is expended in the pursuit
of income or in connection with property held for the production of
income, it is allowable. 29 It is thus arguable that the origin test
enunciated in Gilmore does not give full effect to the scope of
deductions envisioned by Congress in both sections 162 and 212.10
In Gilmore, the Court chose to adopt the origin test and to reject
what may be called the consequence test, which was derived from the
lower court decision and from the several circuit court decisions3
permitting the taxpayer to deduct expenses when, as a consequence of
resisting his wife's claims to income-producing property, he preserved
his property. By limiting its choice of standards for determining
26. McDonald v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 67 (1944) (dissenting opinion in 5.4
decision).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (1958).
28. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
29. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1942) (emphasis added).
30. For an excellent examination of the Gilmore Court's reasoning and a thorough
discussion of the argument that the origin test is not the exclusive test to be applied to § 212,





deductibility under section 212 to the origin and consequence tests, the
Supreme Court neglected the direct connection test adopted by
Kornhauser.
Although Gilmore has precluded further application of the
consequence test, its failure explicitly to invalidate the direct connection
test may provide some basis for the deductibility of estate planning fees
that are directly connected with the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income. The Court
in Gilmore apparently was unwilling to abrogate the direct connection
test in favor of its origin test, but it may have intended to establish two
alternative or concomitant tests. Referring to Kornhauser and Deputy,
the Court stated:
The principle we derive from these cases is that the characterization, as "business"
or "personal," of the litigation costs of resisting a claim depends on whether or
not the claim arises in connection with the taxpayer's profit-seeking activities.32
This statement indicates that the Court intended to affirm the direct
connection test, while not applying it to the factual situation presented
in Gilnore.
C. The Trust of Bingham Case-Application of the Direct
Connection Test to Trust Management
The leading case interpreting section 23(a)(2), the predecessor of
section 212, and a case heavily relied on by Gilmore for the proposition
that sections 162 and 212 are governed by the same limitations,3 3 is
Trust of Bingham v. Commi ;sionerl4 which restated the Kornhauser
standard that an expense is deductible if it is "directly connected with
or proximately results from the conduct of the [taxpayers'] business."35
In the Bingham Trust case the Supreme Court held that attorney's fees
paid by a trustee in unsuccessfully contesting an income tax deficiency
assessment, in obtaining advice in connection with the payment of a
cash legacy, and in formally distributing the trust corpus and
terminating the trust were deductible expenses for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of
income. The Court determined that the objections to the deductions
failed "to take proper account of the plain language of sections 23(a)
(2), and the purpose of the section as disclosed by its statutory setting
and legislative history." 36
32. 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963) (emphasis by Court).
33. See note 17 supra.
34. 325 U.S. 365 (1945).
35. Id. at 374 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 369-70. See also Herbst v. Commissioner, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 361 (1943), in
1969]
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In upholding the deductions as ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred for the management of income-producing property, the Court
stated that it is not necessary for expenses to result in the collection
or production of income.
To read this section as requiring that expenses be paid for the production of
income in order to be deductible, is to make unnecessary and to read out of the
section the provision for the deduction of expenses of management of property
held for the production of income.37
The Court emphasized that the purpose of section 212 was to provide
for a class of nonbusiness deductions coextensive with the business
deductions except that they must be incurred for the production of
income or in the management or conservation of property held for the
production of income.38 Continuing its analogy between business and
nonbusiness deductions, the Court enunciated the direct connection
test:
Such expenses need not relate directly to the production of income for the
business. It is enough that the expense, if "ordinary and necessary," is directly
connected with orproximately results from the conduct of the business. .... 1
Since there is no requirement that business expenses be for the production of
income, there is no reason for that requirement in the case of like expenses of
managing a trust, so long as they are in connection with the management of
property which is held for the production of income."
After holding that the expenses connected with the dev6lution of the
trust property were deductible, the Court said:
What we have said applies with equal force to the expenses of contesting the tax
deficiency. Section 23(a)(2) does not restrict deductions to those litigation expenses
which alone produce income. On the contrary, by its terms and in analogy with
the rule under § 23(a)(1), the business expense section, the trust, a taxable entity
like a business, may deduct litigation expenses when they are directly connected
with or proximately result from the enterprise-the management of property held
for production of income."
The Bingham Trust case thus established that the expenses
which the Tax Court allowed the deduction of expenses for attorney's services in representing
taxpayer in the termination of a trust, preparing a release covering the delivery of trust assets to
the trust beneficiary-taxpayer, arranging for the opening of a special investment account, and
preparing a custodian agreement for the account.
37. 325 U.S. at 373; see note 18supra.
38. 325 U.S. at 373. The Court cited H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 46, 74-
76, and S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1942).
39. 325 U.S. at 373-74 (emphasis added). Here the Court cited Kornhauser v. United
States, 276 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1928), and Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 470-71
(1943).
40. 325 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added).




incurred in terminating a trust and disbursing trust assets are within
section 212(2) even though such expenses are not incurred with the
intent that they will themselves produce income; it is enough that the
expense is connected with the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property that is held for production of income. The
holding of the Bingham Trust case and the Gilmore Court's explicit
recognition of the direct connection test in its reference to Kornhauser
would seem to affirm the continued applicability of the direct
connection test to section 212(2). Additional support for the continued
existence of the direct connection test can be found in the fact that the
Lykes Court recognized and distinguished the Bingham Trust case.42
Following Bingham Trust, the direct connection test was restated
by the Seventh Circuit in the form of a "proximate relation" test: "It
is not the personal liability but rather the nature of the expense itself,
and the proximate relation to .. .income producing property of the
taxpayer which is the standard for determining whether an expense is
deductible under . . . [section 212(2)]."1 3 Quoting from Bingham
Trust, the court held that the legal expense incurred by the
remainderman of a trust in successfully contesting the assessment of
estate taxes against the property was in proximate relation to the
conservation of income-producing property and, therefore, deductible.
The trust property was held for the production of income; first by the
decedent-grantor, then by the trustees, and finally by the taxpayer as
remainderman.
More recently, in 1967, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on
Bingham Trust in holding that a trustee's termination fees for the
management, conservation, or maintenance of that part of the trust
property held for the production of taxable income were deductible by
the trust beneficiary under section 212(2).4 The court also relied on
Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(i) which provides: "Reasonable
amounts paid or incurred by the fiduciary of an estate or trust on
account of administration expenses . . . which are ordinary and
necessary in connection with the performance of the duties of
administration are deductible under section 212 . . . ." In addition,
deductions have been allowed for attorneys' fees paid by a trust grantor
42. In Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118, 124 n.l1 (1952), the Court stated that the
expenses incurred in contesting the income tax deficiency and in winding up the trust "were
integral parts of the management or conservation of the trust property for the production of
income and, as such, deductible under § 23(a)(2)."
43. Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251, 253 (7th Cir. 1954) (emphasis added).
44. Whittemore v. United States, 383 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1967). See also Case v. United
States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9764 (D. Wyo. 1966).
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for services in procuring the reformation of a trust 5 and for fees paid
by a trust grantor or beneficiary for the management of a trust fund."0
Restrictions on deducting the expense of creating and
administering an estate plan before death would seem to be inconsistent
with the treasury regulations'4 7 practically unrestricted allowance of
deductions for all legal expenses incurred in administering, preserving,
and distributing the assets of an estate.
Since the expenses incurred in the operation, administration, and
termination of a trust are deductible when the trust property is held for
the production of income, it is inequitable not to allow similar
deductions for expenses incurred by a taxpayer for advice and services
in creating and administering an estate plan, so long as such expenses
are clearly allocated to that portion of the expense incurred in
connection with property held for the production of taxable income.
Such expenses are incurred as much for the safeguarding and managing
of property as are the expenses of administering a trust. 48
D. Estate Planning Fees Analogized to Dedictible Investment
Counseling Fees
Estate planning fees may be deductible under section 212(2) as
expenses incurred for the management or conservation of income-
producing property by analogy to the deductions allowed for the
expenses of investment counsel. The treasury regulations specifically
provide deductions for investment counsel fees and similar expenses
incurred in connection with investments held by the taxpayer if they are
for the production of income or for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of investments held for the production of income.4
Applying the direct connection test of Bingham Trust, the Tax
Court in Nancy R. Bagley allowed deductions for investment counsel
fees and attorneys' fees paid for reviewing the merits and legal aspects
of various estate plans for the rearrangement of taxpayer's
investments." Cases have uniformly held that investment counseling
45. William J. Garland, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 419 (1943).
46. William Ziegler, I B.T.A. 186 (1924); Rev. Rul. 58-53, 1958-1 Cui. BULL. 152.
47. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.212-1() & 20.2053-3(a),(c),(d) (1957). See also Miller, Estate Tax
Deductions, 102 TRUSTS & Es. 859, 862 (1963).
48. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44 (1963). See also A.J. CASNER, ESTATE
PLANNING 121 (3d ed. 1961); 4 A.J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 25.09, at
19-20 (rev. ed. 1960). Such a deduction was permitted by the Tax Court in Nancy R. Bagley, 8
T.C. 130 (1947), acquiesced in 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 1.
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(g) (1957).
50. Nancy R. Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947), acquiesced in 1947-1 Cum. BULL, 1.
[Vol. 23
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fees, such as fees paid for information furnished to a taxpayer as to
which investments to buy, sell, or keep, are generally deductible.', Also
deductible are the cost of managing investments, 52 and the expenses of
accounting and auditing services incurred in connection with the
taxpayer's investment activities.53 Where expenses for legal advice
concerning the tax treatment of annuities, dividends, holding periods on
certain stocks acquired by gifts, and partial loss deductions were
likewise held deductible, the Tax Court stated that "[t]he expenditures
appear to have been for legal advice related solely to an ascertainment
of proper tax liability and they have a bearing upon the management,
conservation, or maintenance of his property held for the production
of income." 5 Similarly, a district court, in holding that the expenses
of legal advice obtained for the protection of taxpayers' investments
were deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the
management and conservation of income-producing property, stated
that deductibility should depend upon the necessity of obtaining counsel
to protect the investments.5 More recently, the Court of Claims held
that the expenses of investment advice obtained for the purpose of
rearranging and diversifying the taxpayers' personal investments in
order to improve their capacity to produce income were deductible as
expenses incurred for the management of income-producing property.
It can be argued that the legal fees incurred in estate planning are
distinguishable from the deductible investment counseling fees on the
ground that the latter directly contribute to the production of income
while the estate planning services make only a remote contribution to
income production. Estate planning services, however, bear upon and
are ordinarily incurred for the purposes of managing and conserving
income-producing property to the same extent as investment counseling
services.
51. Elma M. Williams, 3 T.C. 200 (1944); Edward Mallinckrodt, Jr., 2 T.C. 1128 (1943),
affd on other grounds, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945); Amelia E.
Collins, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 223 (1944); Andrew Jergens, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 385 (1943);
Estate of Winifred L. Milner, I CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 513 (1943).
52. Frederick B. Rentschler, I T.C. 814 (1943); Ezra Winter, I- CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 274
(1942); Barbara S. Kirkland, I CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 99 (1942). But see Stoddard v.
Commissioner, 141 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
53. Edward Mallinckrodt, 2 T.C. 1128 (1943), affd on other grounds, 146 F.2d I (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871 (1945); Estate of Winifred L. Milner, I CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
274 (1942).
54. Philip D. Armour, 6 T.C. 359, 363 (1946) (emphasis added).
55. Straub v. Granger, 143 F. Supp. 250 (W.D. Pa. 1956) (fees were paid to an attorney
who advised taxpayer, a family group of minority shareholders in a closely held corporation, to
purchase additional stock in order to protect their prior investment in the corporation against
changes in the operation of the corporation which the controlling directors contemplated making).
56. Picker v. United States, 371 F.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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Apparently observing this strong similarity, the Tax Court in the
case of Hobart J. Hendrick57 allowed a taxpayer who had a vested
remainder in the corpus of an estate to deduct attorneys' fees paid to
keep the taxpayer-remainderman advised as to the management of the
estate corpus even though the taxpayer received no income from the
estate during the taxable year. An earlier case had held that attorneys'
fees paid for services rendered in attending to taxpayer's interest as
income beneficiary and remainderman of a trust and to'his interest in
connection with his father's estate were deductible expenses." Both
courts stated that the taxpayers' interests constituted property held for
the production of income, and any expense conducive to the
preservation and maintenance of such property was deductible. The
courts found the taxpayers' attorneys' services comparable to
investment advice since the purpose of the legal advice was both to
enhance the income of the taxpayers' property and to aid in preserving
it.
These cases permitting deductions for legal advice rendered in
connection with property interests owned by the taxpayer and from
which he receives or will in the future receive taxable income suggest
that the expenses of any legal services, including will drafting, incurred
in connection with a taxpayer's property are deductible under section
212(2) provided the taxpayer himself does or will receive the income
from the property. Indeed, in Nancy R. Bagley"9 the court denied a
deduction for the expenses of legal services rendered in the creation of
a trust by the taxpayer for the benefit of her daughter, but allowed a
deduction for an identical expense incurred for the creation of trusts
for the management of the taxpayer's property for her own benefit, the
income being reserved to her for life.
E. Deductions Under Section 212(2)for Estate Planning Fees
The ratio decidendi of the Bingham Trust60 case, of the cases
allowing deductions of all investment management expenses" and of
the fees for attending to taxpayers' interest as estate or trust
beneficiaries,"2 and of the Nancy R. Bagley case63 needs only a slight
extension to permit the deduction of the expense of estate planning
57. 35 T.C. 1223 (1961).
58. Herman W. Fletcher, 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 793 (1951).
59. 8 T.C. 130 (1947). See text accompanying notes 4748 supra.
60. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
61. See text accompanying notes 49-55 supra.
62. See text accompanying notes 57-58 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 50 & 59 supra.
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services rendered in connection with property which is owned by and
provides income for the taxpayer. Thus to the extent that the attorney's
activities relate to the investment management, 4 rearrangement, or
reinvestment65 of the taxpayer-client's income-producing property or to
the creation, " reformation, 7 or termination 8 of a trust, or to the
drafting of a will 9 involving property held for the production of income
for the taxpayer, the attorney's fees should be deductible under section
212(2) as expenses incurred for the management, conservation, or
maintenance of property held for the production of income. The
expenses sought to be deducted will have to be carefully allocated to
services relating to property held for the production of income for the
taxpayer. Expenses which are not deductible under section 212(2)
because they arise from a primarily personal activity70 or because they
do not relate to the management of income-producing property7' may,
nevertheless, be deductible under section 212(3)72 as expenses for the
determination of a future tax liability.
64. See cases cited in notes 49-55 supra and accompanying text.
65. See Picker v. United States, 371 F.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1967), and text accompanying note
56 supra. See also Gordon, Are Legal Fees Deductible?. 44 MicH. S.B.J., 11 (1965).
66. See Nancy R. Bagley, 8 T.C. 130 (1947), and text accompanying notes 50 & 59 supra.
See also A.J. CASNER, ESTATE PLANNING 121 (3d ed. 1961); Kabaker, Deductibility of Estate
Planning Fees, 54 ILL. B.J. 726, 730 (1966).
67. See William J. Garland, 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 419 (1943) (attorney's fees incurred
for services in procuring reformation of a trust deductible).
68. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945); text accompanying notes 35-
42 supra.
69. The only case concerning the deduction of the legal fee of writing a will was decided
prior to the enactment of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. I, 23(a)(2), 53 Stat. 12 (now INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 212). In the case of Helen S. Pennell, 4 B.T.A. 1039 (1926), the Board of Tax
Appeals held that attorney's fees paid for advice relating to the protection of taxpayer's rights in
her husband's property, investment counseling, writing a will, and management of taxpayer's
personal affairs were not deductible expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business as
provided in § 214(a)(1) of the Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 214(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1066. The taxpayer
there failed to allocate that portion of her legal expenses attributable to the conservation of
income-producing property and that attributable to purely personal activity.
70. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963), and United States v. Patrick, 372
U.S. 53 (1963), discussed in text accompanying notes 9-12 supra; Lykes v. United States, 343
U.S. 118 (1952), discussed in text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
71. The expenses incurred in making any kind of gift thus would not be deductible under
§ 212(2) because the property given away by the taxpayer is no longer held by the taxpayer for
the production of income. See Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952), discussed in text
accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
72. In United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963), discussed in text accompanying notes
9-12 supra, the possibility of a deduction under § 212(3) apparently was overlooked since no
portion of the fees was specifically allocated to tax planning incident to the separation and
property settlement arrangements.
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III. DEDUCTIONS UNDER SECTION 2120)
Almost all estate planning problems involve the issue of taxes.
Solutions are sought which will attain the objectives of the client-
taxpayer as to the arrangement, management, and distribution of his
property and at the same time minimize the tax burden on his estate
and family. The trend of recent decisions indicates that at least that
portion of legal fees incurred for estate planning purposes in connection
with the consideration of tax problems are deductible under section
212(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provides that:
In the case of an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year ....
(3) in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.?a
Prior to the enactment of this section, the Supreme Court, in
Lykes v. United States,74 held that legal expenses incurred in
connection with litigation of federal gift tax liability, unlike those
resulting from a contest over the assessment of income or estate taxes,
were not deductible under the predecessor of section 212(2) as expenses
for the management, conservation, or maintenance of income-
produci.ng property because the gift was not for production or
collection of income. The Lykes decision was apparently a judicial
reaction to lower court decisions which had strained the interpretation
of section 212(2) and the direct connection test of Bingham Trust75 so
as to disregard prior decisions. Thus one court allowed a deduction for
legal fees paid for the preparation of taxpayers' tax returns76 in direct
opposition to an earlier judicial statement "that Congress never
intended to allow as a deduction such a purely personal expenditure."'
However, the Lykes decision created the inequitable situation of
denying deductions for legal fees connected with contesting gift tax
assessments while identical legal expenses were deductible if incurred in
connection with the determination of income tax78 or estate tax79
liability.
73. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 212(3).
74. 343 U.S. 118 (1952). See also discussion in text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
75. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945). See text accompanying notes
35-42 supra.
76. Rush v. United States, 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9752 (N.D. Ala. 1959); David L, Loew,
7 T.C. 363 (1946).
77. Higgins v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 654, 655 (1st Cir. 1944).
78. Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945); Stoddard v. Commissioner,
152 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1945); Harry Dunitz, 7 T.C. 672 (1946), affd without discussion, 167 F.2d
223 (6th Cir. 1948); James A. Connelly, 6 T.C. 744 (1946); Philip D. Armour, 6 T.C. 359 (1946);
Howard E. Cammack, 5 T.C. 467 (1945).
79. Northern Trust Co. v. Campbell, 211 F.2d 251 (7th Cir. 1954).
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Thus one of the purposes of adding subsection (3) to section 212
was to change the rule of the Lykes case so that an individual could
deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses paid in connection with the
determination, collection, or refund of any tax."1 The Internal Revenue
Service has adopted the position that deductions under section 212(3)
are restricted to legal expenses incurred for tax advice in connection
with actual tax controversies or completed transactions and that
expenses incurred in connection with future or prospective taxes or
contemplated transactions are not deductible. This position is
apparently based upon the report of the House Ways and Means
Committee on the then-proposed section which stated that section
212(3) "is designed to permit the deduction . . . of. . . expenses paid
. . . in connection with a contested tax liability . . . . Any expenses
incurred in contesting any liability collected as a tax . . . will be
deductible. 82 Thus, until recently, the deductibility of attorneys' fees
incurred for tax planning and counseling services relating to proposed
transactions has been in doubt.8
Notwithstanding the attempt of the Internal Revenue Service to
limit the deduction under section 212(3) to expenses incurred for tax
counsel in connection with completed transactions or actual tax
controversies, recent cases have indicated that the deduction under
section 212(3) is not to be so limited.
A. The Davis Case
In Davis v. United States,8 4 the Court of Claims held that
80. The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the then proposed section
states: "Existing law allows an individual to deduct expenses connected with earning income or
managing and maintaining income-producing property. Under the regulations costs incurred in
connection with contests over certain tax liabilities, such as income and estate taxes, have been
allowed, but these costs have been disallowed where the contest involved gift-tax liability. A new
provision added by your committee allows a deduction for expenses connected with determination,
collection, or refund of any tax liability." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1954)
(emphasis added). See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1954).
81. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A59 (1954) states further: "Paragraph (3)
is new and is designed to permit the deduction by an individual of legal and other expenses paid
or incurred in connection with a ,contested tax liability, whether the contest be Federal, State, or
municipal taxes, or whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, and so forth. Any expenses
incurred in contesting any liability collected as a tax or as a part of the tax will be deductible."
(Emphasis added).
82. Id.; see Bonnyman v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Tenn. 1957), affd, 261
F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1958).
83. See De Castro, Recent Cases Show Liberal Trend in Allowing Deductions for Legal
Fees, 23 J. TAX. 224 (1965).
84. 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
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attorneys' fees incurred for the purpose of examining the tax aspects
of a proposed separation and property settlement agreement were
properly deductible from gross income. The court specifically relied on
the language of Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1 (1), which provides
that "expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel . . . in
connection with any proceedings involved in determining the extent of
his tax liability . ..are deductible. 85 The Court of Claims made
specific reference to the fact that the taxpayer's attorney's bill had
allocated a portion of his fees to services regarding the separation
agreement and a portion to services in regard to tax matters.
Presumably such an allocation will avoid the rule of section 262
prohibiting the deduction of personal, family, or living expenses. 6 The
court did not state whether the "proceeding" involved, namely the
divorce and separation, was necessary to its decision in light of the
language of the Treasury Regulation which it cited.
B. The Kaufman Case
In Kaufman v. United States,87 a federal district court permitted
three taxpayers to deduct accountants' fees incurred for consultation
concerning the tax consequences of alternative proposed plans for
exchanging their stockholdings in a closely held corporation and fees
for obtaining an Internal Revenue Service advance ruling on the tax
consequences of the exchange. The court denied a deduction for the fees
allocable to a determination of the basis of the stock received by the
taxpayers under the plan of reorganization.
Citing a report of the House Ways and Means Committee,"8 the
government contended that the legislative history of section 212(3)
indicated a congressional intent to limit the deductions under that
section to only those expenses incurred in the preparation of tax returns
and in the actual determination and contesting of tax liability, thereby
precluding any deduction for expenses incident to a determination of
tax liability prior to the time it becomes contested. The court
specifically rejected this argument and replied that when the legislative
history does not agree with the language of the Act itself, "then the
85. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957), cited at 287 F.2d 170 (emphasis added).
86. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1958) provides that
"attorney's fees and other costs paid in connection with a divorce, separation, or decree for
support are not deductible ....
87. 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, A59 (1954). See notes 80-81 supra.
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court is bound by the clear and commonly understood meaning of the
Act." 9
Relying on the clear language of subsection (3), the court noted
that the determination, collection, and refund of a tax liability are
separate and distinct phases of a tax controversy. The court stated that
under Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(1) "the taxpayer is entitled
to deduct expenses paid or incurred in connection with the preparation
of his tax return, 'or in connection with any proceedings involved in
determining the extent of his tax liability,"' '0 and held that the request
for a ruling was a "proceeding," the expense of which was properly
deductible."
Denying the deduction for fees incurred in connection with the
computation of stock basis, the court stated: "There was no
controversy at that time as to the tax base of the new stock. ... The
base was computed for the information of the taxpayers or for some
possible future use, and not for the purpose of determining any tax. "
'
2
This last statement seems to be an acceptance by the court of the
government's argument that a tax contest or a completed transaction
is a prerequisite to deductibility under section 212(3) and that expenses
incurred in connection with future taxes or contemplated transactions
are not deductible. Such a position appears inconsistent with the theory
of the court in allowing the deduction of the remaining portions of the
accountant's fees.93 The ruling as well as the computation of the basis
of the stock was "for the information of the taxpayers" and for their
"future use." Surely the basis of the stock would be a significant factor
in the taxpayers' consideration of any later disposition of their stock
and in the determination of their tax liability upon such disposition.
The court's reference to a controversy and its denial of the
deduction in connection with the computation of stock basis is
inconsistent with the Treasury Regulation94 providing that expenses
89. 227 F. Supp. at813-14.
90. Id. at 814, citing Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957) (emphasis added).
9 1. "[T]he sole purpose of the expenditure was the computation of the tax liability, if any,
which would arise from the exchange." 227 F. Supp. at 815.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. De Castro, Recent Cases Show Liberal Trend in Allowing Deductions for Legal Fees,
23 J. TAX. 224 (1965); see Kabaker, Deductibility-of Estate Planning Fees, 54 ILL. B.J. 726
(1966); Scott, Deductions for Cost of Tax Advice Are Often Subject to IRS Attack, 22 J. TAX.
174 (1965).
94. "Expenses paid or incurred by an individual in connection with the determination,
collection, or refund of any tax, whether the taxing authority be Federal, State, or municipal,
and whether the tax be income, estate, gift, property, or any other tax, are deductible. Thus,
expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel or expenses paid or incurred in connection
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incurred for tax counsel alone are deductible. This Regulation and the
remainder of the Kaufman opinion would indicate that the sale of the
stock or a controversy as to its basis should be irrelevant to the
deductibility of the expense. 5 It is arguable that the fees for the
computation of the stock basis could be deducted on the authority of
Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(g),9" which specifically allows the
deduction of investment counseling fees.
In the final analysis, however, it is apparent that the court'really
disallowed the deduction of the accountant's fees for the computation
of the stock basis because that service or tax counsel was not related
to any immediate tax determination, but was only "for some possible
future use." Such rationale would appear to prohibit the deduction
under section 212(3) of expenses for tax counsel in connection with
estate planning not relating to an immediate tax liability, such as
drafting a will and setting up a revocable inter vivos trust resulting in
no gift tax to the grantor-settlor. However, the expenses of such legal
services may still be deductible under section 212(2) if incurred in
connection with income-producing property held by the taxpayer."
In both Davis and Kaufman the immediate tax consequences arose
out of a "proceeding," namely a divorce and a request for a revenue
ruling to determine the tax consequences that would occur immediately
upon consummation of the transactions in question, but neither court
intimated whether some type of proceeding was a prerequisite to
deductibility under section 212(3). In the case of Carpenter v. United
States 8 the Court of Claims made no mention of a tax proceeding.
C. The Carpenter Case
The Carpenter case, on facts similar to those in the Davis case,
held that the legal fees incurred in examining the tax aspects of a
proposed property settlement agreement in a divorce action were
deductible under section 212(3) as an expense in connection with the
determination of the taxpayer's income tax liability.99
with the preparation of his tax returns or in connection with any proceedings involved in
determining the extent of tax liability or in contesting his tax liability are deductible." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.212-1(1) (1957).
95. See Scott, Deductions for Cost of Tax Advice are Often Subject to IRS Attack, 22 J.
TAx. 174 (1965).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(g) (1957);seenote49supra.
97. See notes 60-70 supra and accompanying text.
98. 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
99. The taxpayer's attorney's efforts were directed primarily to ensuring that the support
payments agreed to be made by taxpayer to his former wife would constitute taxable income to
the latter and hence be deductible by taxpayer.
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The Government argued that the decision of the Davis case should
be overruled because there was nothing in the statute or regulations' 0
to indicate provision for tax counsel except in proceedings involving tax
controversies, and because the Gilmore decision' 01 precluded the
deduction of legal expenses arising out of divorce and property
settlements. The court rejected those arguments noting that the
Gilmore decision was based upon section 212(2) and that the Court
there distinguished section 212(2) from section 212(3)."2 Stating that
the plain language of section 212(3) is not limited to contested tax
controversies or the preparation of tax returns, the court relied on
Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1 (1) which provides four separate
examples of expenses which are deductible under section 212(3). These
are: (1) expenses for tax counsel; (2) expenses in connection with the
preparation of tax returns; (3) expenses in connection with any
proceedings involved in determining the extent of tax liability; and (4)
expenses in contesting tax liability. 03 The court asserted that there is
nothing in the regulations to suggest that these four examples are
exclusive; they are merely illustrative.
In support of the Davis decision's allowance of a deduction for tax
counsel, the court in Carpenter analogized tax counsel fees to
investment counsel fees, which are specifically allowed by Treasury
Regulation section 1.212-1(g), and noted that investment counseling is
certainly prospective in nature.
Obviously, a taxpayer does not employ investment counsel after he has made his
investments, and he should not be restricted to deductions of expenses for tax
counsel solely to discover the tax consequences of what has already transpired or
a tax liability already accrued. One of the purposes of a taxpayer in obtaining tax
counsel is to avoid tax contests, not to create them, and this also serves the interest
of the Government in collecting taxes.10
In further support of the Davis decision, the court pointed out that
under the present procedure of tax collection, the taxpayer must
determine his own tax liability by a method of self-assessment, and, for
advice in arriving at this determination, the taxpayer may, under
100. In support of this position the Government again relied on Senate and House
Committee reports, S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 218; H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 29, A59. See notes 80-81 supra. "Any expenses incurred in contesting any liability
collected as a tax or as part of a tax will be deductible." H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d
Sess. A59 (1954).
101. 372 U.S. 39 (1963). See notes 9-12supra and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 48 n.16. The Supreme Court stated: "Expenses of contesting tax liabilities are
now deductible under section 212(3) of the 1954 Code."
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(I) (1957), quoted in full in note 94 supra.
104. 338 F.2d at 369.
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Treasury Regulation section 1.212-1(1), deduct the fees of tax counsel.
The court concluded:
To restrict the deductibility of expense for tax counsel to the computation or
contest of a tax liability for completed tax years under the particular facts in this
case, would defeat the clear purpose of [s]ection 212(3) and the Regulations
[section] 1.212-1.115
This language unquestionably indicates that the Carpenter court
considered the determination of tax consequences to include
contemplated as well as completed transactions.
D. Deductions Under Section 212(3)for Estate Planning Fees
The primary problem in the Davis case was the inclusion in
income for the specific tax year involved of the gain from the use of
appreciated property in a lump sum divorce property settlement. The
Carpenter case, on the other hand, was concerned not only with the
taxpayer's tax liability for the year in which the divorce settlement was
concluded, but also the annual deductibility from income of alimony
payments made in future years. While the tax consequences of certain
estate planning activity, such as the making of gifts and the creation
of inter vivos trusts, will be immediate, other estate planning services,
such as will drafting and the creation of testamentary trusts, will result
only in future tax consequences not unlike those considered in the
Carpenter case.
While no decision has yet considered the restrictive position of the
Internal Revenue Service under section 212(3) as it relates to fees for
estate planning services, it should be remembered that Nancy R.
Bagley' allowed deductions under the forerunner of section 212(2) for
attorneys' fees paid for review of the taxpayer's estate plan, the
creation of certain trusts, and other alterations in the taxpayer's
income-producing assets, all of which were designed to increase the
earning power of the taxpayer's assets and to reduce taxes. The court
stressed the fact that the taxpayer would enjoy immediate tax benefits
from the reorganization of her estate. The same case, however, denied
a deduction for the expense of legal services in determining what assets
the taxpayer should use in a gift program.07 The Davis, Kaufman, and
105. Id. at 370.
106. 8 T.C. 130 (1947), acquiesced in 1947-1 Curt. BULL. I. See notes 50 & 59 supra and
accompanying text.
107. "We are unable to see what possible connection the disposition of part of petitioner's
income-producing securities by way of gift in trust could have with the production or collection
of income; nor do we think that it can properly be said to have a proximate connection with the
management, conservation, or maintenance of such property." 8 T.C. at 135.
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Carpenter decisions would seem to cast serious doubt on the continuing
significance of this second Bagley holding. The expenses for tax advice
concerning proposed donative transfers, where the gift tax liability of
the donor is affected by the character of the property used in the
donative program, may be allowed under section 212(3) rather than
under 212(2), thus avoiding the Bagley decision.
Since estate planning fees are clearly personal ekpenses, at first
glance they may seem to be within the prohibition of section 262,1°8
which disallows deductions for "personal, living, and family expenses."
Under the "origin test" of Gilmore, estate planning fees for tax advice
would seem to be classified as personal expenses subject to section 262.
This possibility was negated, however, by a footnote to the Gilmore
decision where the Supreme Court stated:
Expenses of contesting tax liabilities are now deductible under [section] 212(3)
of the 1954 Code. This provision merely represents a policy judgment as to a
particular class of expenditures otherwise non-deductible, like extraordinary
medical expenses . . . .
It seems evident that the Court was recognizing a legislative intention
to make the expenses of tax counsel an exception to the rule of section
262.
The rationale of the Davis, Kaufman, and Carpenter cases would
permit deductions under section 212(3) for expenses of tax. counseling
which takes place after the occurrence of the transactions or events and
for tax counseling which contemplates immediate and certain
occurrence of the event from which tax consequences will ensue.
However, it is questionable ,whether the Carpenter decision can be
extended to allow a deduction for the expense of tax counseling where
the taxable events are uncertain and in futuro, as would be the case of
estate planning services for the arranging of future or testamentary
gifts by the client-taxpayer, the drafting of a will to become effective
at the client-taxpayer's death, the creation of testamentary trusts, and
other property dispositions. The dissent in Carpenter would limit the
application of section 212(3) to deductions for tax counsel employed
in connection with the preparation of tax returns or with tax
proceedings since these are based on past or settled events. 110 The
108. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 262.
109. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39,48 n.16 (1963).
110. "It is not entirely clear whether the regulation [Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(1)] extends
further back to the period when the transactions are still in the process of being planned or the
taxable events are still uncertain or infuturo. . . . I interpret it, however, not as authorizing the
deduction of expenses paid for any tax counsel, but only for tax counsel employed in connection
with the preparation or consideration of tax returns or with tax proceedings, i.e., tax advice given
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majority adopted a broader meaning of section 212(3) allowing the
taxpayer to deduct the expense of tax counsel employed before the
events had been settled, i.e. before the divorce, separation, and alimony
decree, and for tax consequences which would occur in future years.
If the reasoning of the Carpenter court is broadly construed, the
decision will have far-reaching implications in the area of estate tax
planning. It may be argued that the court in Carpenter intended that
expenses incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel be deductible in any
situation.' This would encompass all planning efforts directed toward
the determination or minimization of any taxes. Therefore, expenses
incurred in all tax planning involving personal holdings and estates,
which were heretofore barred from deduction under section 262 as
personal expenses," 2 would be deductible. However, a limiting factor
on such broad deductibility is indicated in the Carpenter decision. The
court pointed out that the taxpayer employed tax counsel to minimize
the tax consequences concerning the tax year when the divorce property
settlement was concluded, as well as the taxpayer's future annual
alimony payments. The court stated:
These tax consequences were the result of the same transaction, which had to be
considered in toto in 1957 when plaintiff employed tax counsel. If plaintiff is
entitled to deduct expenses for legal assistance in preparing his 1957 tax return,
this legal assistance or counsel had to consider and evaluate the entire tax
problem, in which 1957 was an inseparable part."3
Thus, it is argutble that the Carpenter decision encompasses only
expenses for tax counseling concerning past events and tax counseling
which contemplates the certain and immediate occurrence of future
taxable events.
While the Davis, Kauffnan, and Carpenter cases each involved the
deductibility of legal fees representing services with respect to the
current income tax liability of the taxpayer, the Carpenter decision
recognized that the tax counseling involved applied not only to tax
after the critical events have taken place or been settled. Tax counsel designed to help future
transactions or arrangements is not covered. ...
* * .The words of the Code (determination, collection, or refund of any tax') connote an
appraisal of tax liability on the basis of past or settled events, not a molding of future events to
minimize taxes. Each of the three words deals with a function related to taxes already due or
about to become due, not with planning ahead." Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 371.-
72 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
11. See 18 VAND. L. REV. 1611 (1965).
112. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
chapter, no deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses."
113. Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366, 370 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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liability of the current year, but also to tax liability of future years,
and the court did not use that distinction to disqualify the deduction.
No case has been decided allowing a deduction for the expense of
tax counseling services that are in no way connected with the current
tax liability of the taxpayer, but relate only to future or prospective tax
consequences. However, the dissenting opinion in the Carpenter case
may be as significant as the holding itself. This opinion states:
The ultimate consequence of the wider view of the regulation [Treas. Reg. 1.212-
1 (1)], adopted by this court, is that individual taxpayers will be able automatically
to deduct counsel fees paid for the general planning of their holdings and estates
so as to minimize income, estate, or gift taxes in the years ahead, or for arranging
marital or family affairs with the same end of tax-minimization in the future, or
for planning charitable or foundation gifts (and allocation of assets) for such a
purpose."'
In light of the foregoing discussion, it may be possible to derive
from the holdings of the Davis, Kaufman, and Carpenter cases a
standard or principle applicable to future deductions claimed under
section 212(3). The expense incurred by an individual taxpayer for
counsel concerning the tax consequences of either a contemplated or a
completed matter will be deductible if the advice is directly connected
with the taxpayer's tax liability, regardless of whether the purpose of
such advice was to minimize, determine, collect, or refund any present
or future tax liability, if the procedure followed was reasonably
calculated to attain such a result and if the expenses are otherwise
reasonable."' Accordingly, the expense of any estate planning services
which directly relate to the client-taxpayer's tax liability would be
deductible under section 212(3). Such deductions would not include fees
for the drafting of a will or other instruments connected with estate
planning since the instruments themselves do not affect the client's tax
liability, .but the property arrangements and dispositions embodied in
those instruments create tax consequences to the taxpayer-client.
One writer has suggested that "the deductibility of fees for estate
planning services may depend on the particular devices or instruments
employed.""' Thus expenses incurred in connection with the creation
of a funded revocable or irrevocable trust would be deductible under
section 212(3) as an expense for the determination of tax consequences
if the creation of the funded trust immediately affects the income, gift,
or estate tax liabilities of the settlor.
114. Id. at 372 (dissenting opinion).
115. See 10 VILL. L. REV. 357, 365 (1965).
116. Kabaker, Deductibility of Estate Planning Fees, 54 ILL. B.J. 726,731 (1966).
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The expense of creating an unfunded revocable trust, such as an
insurance trust or a testamentary trust, may be deductible on the basis
of possible estate and gift tax savings upon the death of the settlor and
thereafter. While such tax consequences are entirely prospective, section
212(3) refers to "the determination . . . of an ' tax." As the Carpenter
decision has pointed out, "any tax" is not limited to present tax. "The
minimization of future income and estate taxes should fall within the
purview of the section to the same extent as deductions relating to
current tax problems."'1 7 The court in Carpenter rejected the
government's interpretation of section 212(3) which would limit
deductions to current tax situations.
While it is not clear that estate tax liability has been "determined"
within section 212(3) in a situation where the settlor may later revoke
the plan, the dissenting opinion in Carpenter suggests that the majority
holding would permit the deductibility of expenses in such situations.
Unless and until the settlor takes further positive action, he has
determined his future estate tax liability. The expense of drafting a will
may also be deductible under section 212(3) to the extent that the
property arrangements and dispositions contained therein may offer tax
savings upon the death of the testator. In drafting a will, the attorney
normally analyzes the holdings of his client in order to determine
potential gift and estate tax liability,"' and, if properly'allocated, that
portion is deductible.
It should be noted that the expenses of drafting a will and of
certain other estate planning services which may not qualify for a
deduction under section 212(3) because no tax liability of the taxpayer
is involved may be deductible under section 212(2) as expenses for the
management of income-producing property. For example, the creation
of certain types of trusts, such as a funded revocable trust, may affect
no tax liability of the settlor, and, consequently, a deduction claimed
under section 212(3) would be disallowed. A deduction might be
allowed under section 212(2), however, if the property involved
produces income taxable to the settlor or if the settlor acquires
professional investment supervision of the trust asset through the
nomination of a corporate trustee." 9
IV. CONCLUSION
It would seem safe to state as a general principle that the
117. Id.
118. For an excellent discussion of the deductibility of fees for drafting a will containing
an estate tax marital deduction gift, see id. at 732.
119. Id. at 730, 731.
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deduction of most estate planning service expenses should be allowed
under either section 212(2), section 212(3), or a combination of both
sections. The expenses are deductible under section 212(2) as expenses
for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for
the production of income if the planning services directly relate to
property which produces income taxable to the taxpayer-client.
Alternatively, the expenses are deductible under section 212(3) if they
are solely for tax counsel directly related to the taxpayer-client's tax
liability. Expenses which are not deductible under section 212(3)
because there is no tax liability involved or because the tax
consequences are too uncertain should be deductible under section
212(2) if the services were rendered in connection with property which
produces income to the taxpayer. Nevertheless, some expenses, such as
fees for the-drafting of a will, may be disallowed as nondeductible
personal expenses because they are not genuinely related to the
management of income-producing property.
Because certain estate planning fees will be nondeductible personal
expenses, allocation is the key to deductibility under section 212. Since
the burden of allocation is clearly on the taxpayer,120 the attorney can
be of great assistance to a client by carefully preparing and itemizing
his statement of services rendered. The attorney should apportion his
charges to services for the consideration of tax problems, the
management of income-producing property, the drafting of
instruments, and personal advice. So long as the allocation is
reasonable and made in good faith the deduction should be allowed.
STEPHEN E. GILHULEY
120. Ecco High Frequency Corp. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 825 (1948); Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930); Helen S. Pennell, 4
B.T.A. 1039 (1926).
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